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COMMENT
THE USE OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL IN
DISCOVERY MATTERS
Pretrial Procedure via the Supreme Court
Mark S. Williams
I. INTRODUCTION
The Montana Supreme Court traditionally has restricted issu-
ance of the writ of supervisory control. "It is a fundamental pro-
position that the writ of supervisory control is an extraordinary
remedy which will only be granted under extraordinary circum-
stances."' Interlocutory discovery orders present an area in which
the supreme court is hesitant to issue the writ.2 The court prefers
to abstain from pretrial involvement, an area it considers best left
to the sound discretion of district court judges.' The court fears
that liberal interlocutory review will open a "Pandora's Box of
abuses."'4 In the past decade, however, the court exercised supervi-
sory control over discovery matters in a handful of cases, 5 without
yet unlocking "Pandora's Box."
The informed Montana attorney should realize that the writ of
supervisory control is available even in the discovery process. An
attorney may seek the writ when a district court issues discovery
orders that are neither founded in the Rules of Civil Procedure nor
previously condoned by the Montana Supreme Court, and when
such orders threaten irreparable harm to the client or case. This
1. State ex rel. Seader v. District Court, 143 Mont. 475, 477, 389 P.2d 178, 179 (1964)
(citing State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. District Court, 119 Mont. 429, 431, 175 P.2d 763, 764
(1946)).
2. See State ex rel. Guarantee Ins. Co. v. District Court, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 648
(1981).
3. Id.
4. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 651.
5. See State ex rel. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. District Court, 240 Mont. 5,
783 P.2d 911 (1989); State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. v. District Court, 239 Mont. 207, 779
P.2d 885 (1989); Kuiper v. District Court, - Mont. -, 632 P.2d 694 (1981); Jaap v. Dis-
trict Court, 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389 (1981).
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comment reviews the writ's development, discusses proper use of
the writ and defines the standard of issuance in discovery matters.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History
The Montana Supreme Court invented the writ of supervisory
control in State ex rel. Whiteside v. District Court,6 relying on the
general supervisory power granted by the 1889 Montana Constitu-
tion.' The Montana Constitution provides the supreme court with
"supervisory control over all other courts."8 The Whiteside court
reasoned that the phrase "general supervisory control" contains a
"clear grant of power," and that an appellate court has the inher-
ent power "'to invent new writs to suitably exercise the jurisdic-
tion conferred.' ,, The court deemed the new writ necessary for
situations in which other writs are insufficient."0 Supervisory con-
trol is distinct from the writs of certiorari and prohibition, which
are limited to questions of lower court jurisdiction.1 Supervisory
control is also distinct from mandamus, because mandamus can
compel only a legally required act and is not used to correct errors
or to control lower court judges' discretion. 2 Supervisory control
now overshadows the other writs because of its broad availability
and scope.
Rule 17 of the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure codified
supervisory control. Subsection (a) provides:
The supreme court is an appellate court but it is empowered.
to hear and determine such original and remedial writs as may be
necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
The institution of such original proceedings in the supreme court
is sometimes justified by circumstances of an emergency nature,
as when a cause of action or a right has arisen under conditions
making due consideration in the trial courts and due appeal to
this court an inadequate remedy, or when supervision of a trial
6. 24 Mont. 539, 63 P. 395 (1900).
7. Id. at 558, 63 P. at 398.
8. Id. (quoting MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. VIII, § 2). The language of article VII,
section 2, clause 2 of the 1972 Montana Constitution is identical to that of the 1889 Consti-
tution providing "general supervisory control over all other courts."
9. Whiteside, 24 Mont. at 558, 63 P. at 398 (citing Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irriga-
tion Co., 9 Colo. 248, 11 P. 103 (1886)).
10. Id.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-25-102, 27-27-101 (1989).
12. Whiteside, 24 Mont. at 562, 63 P. at 399-400. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-26-
102 (1989).
[Vol. 52466
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court other than by appeal is deemed necessary or proper.13
After creating the writ in 1900, the Montana Supreme Court se-
verely restricted its use in the first half of the century. The court
avoided appellate interference in pretrial proceedings, lest "appel-
late jurisdiction. . . be destroyed for all practical purposes." '14 The
court eventually discarded this view for a new goal of judicial econ-
omy and embraced pretrial supervisory control for prevention of
needless litigation.15 Using the "needless litigation" standard, the
court has exercised supervisory control to overturn orders at al-
most every phase of the trial process, including motions to dis-
miss,'6 motions to stay proceedings, i" motions for summary judg-
ment, 8 final orders,' 9 rulings on bifurcation of issues 20 and, more
recently, for pretrial discovery rulings.2' Although the court has yet
to intervene in questions of evidence presented during trial, the
court has not ruled out such a possibility.
22
B. Traditional Test for Issuance of the Writ
The court's original standard for exercising supervisory control
is slightly different from the standard used in discovery cases.23
The court considers supervisory control on a case-by-case basis, 24
and occasionally varies the guidelines for issuance of the writ. The
original language set forth in Whiteside authorizes use of the writ
when: (1) "inferior courts . . . are proceeding within their jurisdic-
tion, but," (2) have made a "mistake of law or" are willfully disre-
garding the law, (3) resulting in "a gross injustice," and (4) "there
13. MONT. R. App. P. 17(a).
14. State ex rel. Bonners Ferry Lumber Co. v. District Court, 69 Mont. 436, 443, 222
P. 1050, 1052 (1924).
15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Regis v. District Court, 102 Mont. 74, 55 P.2d 1295 (1936).
16. State ex rel. Buttrey Foods, Inc. v. District Court, 148 Mont. 350, 420 P.2d 845
(1966).
17. State ex rel. Ryder v. District Court, 148 Mont. 56, 417 P.2d 89 (1966).
18. State ex rel. Great Falls Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 154 Mont. 336, 463 P.2d 326
(1969).
19. Walker v. Tschache, 162 Mont. 213, 510 P.2d 9 (1973).
20. State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. District Court, 217 Mont. 106, 703 P.2d 148 (1985).
21. See State ex rel. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. District Court, 240 Mont. 5,
783 P.2d 911 (1989); State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. v. District Court, 239 Mont. 207, 779
P.2d 885 (1989); Kuiper v. District Court, - Mont. -, 632 P.2d 694 (1981); Jaap v. Dis-
trict Court, 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389 (1981).
22. State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court, 168 Mont. 511, 542 P.2d 1222 (1975) (re-
quest for supervisory control on evidence question denied without discussion).
23. This comment will refer to the court's original standard as the "traditional test,"
while referring to the standard employed in discovery cases as the "modified test."
24. State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. District Court, 224 Mont. 384, 730 P.2d 396 (1986).
1991]
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is no appeal, or the remedy by appeal is inadequate. 25
The court also has exercised supervisory control to prevent ex-
tended and needless litigation,26 to alleviate "procedural entangle-
ments" that may prolong the litigation 7 and in cases where, absent
the writ, the relator would be denied a fundamental right.28
III. THE DISCOVERY CASES
A. The Trend in Discovery Cases
The court slightly modified the original standard of issuance
in discovery cases. This modification was based partially on the
court's inherent reluctance to interfere in the trial court's discre-
tion over discovery.29 Furthermore, the court was concerned with
future policy implications that may result from issuance of the writ
in pretrial disputes. By "interjecting itself"30 into discovery mat-
ters, the supreme court would make the trial judge's job more diffi-
cult and open a "Pandora's Box of abuses. '3 1 This would defeat
the goal of speedy and inexpensive discovery and would create the
risk that the court would be buried in a "paper blizzard of applica-
tions for supervisory control.
'3 2
Despite this inherent reluctance, the court has exercised su-
pervisory control over discovery matters and appears ready to do
so more often. Although the court first exercised supervisory con-
trol over a pretrial discovery issue in 1972, it was not until 1989
that the court articulated the appropriate standard for such issu-
ance.33 The court's central goal clearly was judicial efficiency. In
25. State ex rel. Whiteside v. District Court, 24 Mont. 539, 563, 63 P. 395, 400 (1900).
This standard is reiterated in Continental Oil Co. v. Elks National Foundation, 235 Mont.
438, 440, 767 P.2d 1324, 1325-26 (1989), and State Highway Commission v. District Court,
160 Mont. 35, 42-43, 499 P.2d 1228, 1232 (1972).
26. Continental Oil Co. v. Elks Nat'l Found., 235 Mont. 438, 767 P.2d 1324 (1989).
27. State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. District Court, 217 Mont. 106, 114, 703 P.2d 148, 154
(1985). Note that this test corresponds to the previously discussed judicial goal of promoting
efficiency by preventing needless litigation.
28. Id.
29. State ex rel. Guarantee Ins. Co., __ Mont .... 634 P.2d 648, 650 (1981)
(citing Massaro v. Dunham, 184 Mont. 400, 603 P.2d 249 (1979)).
30. Id. at __, 634 P.2d at 651.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. In 1972, the court granted supervisory control to narrow the scope of an interro-
gatory in State ex rel. Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Miller, 160 Mont. 256, 502 P.2d 27
(1972). Nine years later, the court granted supervisory control over discovery issues in two
cases, Jaap v. District Court, 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389 (1981), and Kuiper v. District
Court, - Mont. -, 632 P.2d 694 (1981), without comment on the significance of issuing
the writ for discovery orders. Immediately thereafter, the court denied supervisory control
on a discovery issue in State ex rel. Guarantee Insurance Co. v. District Court, - Mont.
[Vol. 52
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deciding whether to exercise supervisory control, the court weighs
the additional burden of pretrial appellate intervention against the
potential injustice of awaiting a final judgment obtained on an er-
roneous basis.
B. Montana Discovery Cases
1. Jaap and Kuiper
In 1981, the court exercised supervisory control over district
court discovery orders in Jaap v. District Courts4 and Kuiper v.
District Court 5 Without discussion, the court greatly broadened
the availability of the writ, which essentially invited a surge of ap-
plications from litigators disgruntled with lower court rulings.
In Jaap, the district court allowed private discovery interviews
between defense counsel and plaintiff's physicians.36 The supreme
court granted supervisory control without discussing the appropri-
ateness of the writ generally or the merits of the writ in this case.
The court did, however, discuss the district court's error. The su-
preme court held that "a private interview of an adversary witness
is not one of the 'methods' of discovery for which the Rules of Civil
Procedure provide. ' 37 The court further noted that "[a]ny attempt
to enforce a method of discovery not provided by the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure is outside the power of the District Court.
We hold that the [District] Court is without power to order a pri-
vate interview." 38 By failing to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure,
or by attempting to expand them, the district court made an error
of law. Moreover, the remedy by appeal was inadequate because
the damaging interview would have already occurred. Thus, these
circumstances clearly satisfied the necessary requisites for supervi-
sory control as originally set forth in Whiteside.39
In Kuiper v. District Court,4 the plaintiff sued Goodyear Tire
634 P.2d 648 (1981), in which it set forth the previously discussed reasons for not inter-
fering with the district court's trial authority. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 650. It was not until
1989 that the court again granted supervisory control in discovery cases, in State ex rel.
Burlington Northern Railroad v. District Court, 239 Mont. 207, 779 P.2d 885 (1989), and
State ex rel. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. District Court, 240 Mont 5, 783 P.2d
911 (1989), and at the same time added new language that may increase the availability of
the writ.
34. 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389 (1981).
35. - Mont. ., 632 P.2d 694 (1981).
36. Jaap, 191 Mont. at 320-21, 623 P.2d at 1390.
37. Id. at 322-23, 623 P.2d at 1391.
38. Id. at 324, 623 P.2d at 1392.
39. See supra section II (A).
40. - Mont. _ 632 P.2d 694 (1981).
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and Rubber Company in strict liability for a defective tire rim.41
The district court issued a protective order in favor of Goodyear
preventing the use of, or deposition questions regarding, docu-
ments from similar product liability litigation involving the same
rim model. 42 The district court based its reasoning on the attorney-
client privilege, the work product rule and "public policy."43 As in
Jaap, the supreme court did not specifically address issuance of
supervisory control. Asserting supervisory control, the court held
"that the work product rule. . . can form the basis of a protective
order even though the 'work product' is [already] in the possession
of the adverse party. '44 The district court, however, erred by
shielding critical information about the product's defect, knowl-
edge of which was in the public interest.45 The court also stated
that Rule 26(c), Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, "does not pro-
vide for [protective orders based] on 'public policy' grounds." '46 As
in Jaap, the district court erred by issuing a discovery order not
included in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, the remedy
by appeal was inadequate because the damage caused by conceal-
ing the information could not be rectified.
2. State ex rel. Guarantee Insurance Co. v. District Court
Shortly after Kuiper and Jaap, the Montana Supreme Court
suddenly reconsidered the practicality of granting supervisory con-
trol for discovery orders. Observers believe the court reigned in is-
suance of the writ because of a surge in applications following Kui-
per and Japp.47
In Guarantee Insurance,48 the defendant insurance company
claimed two interrogatories were oppressive and burdensome. The
interrogatories requested detailed information on the company's
loss-payment history.49 The district court denied the defendant's
objection and the defendant applied for supervisory control. 50 The
41. Id. at __, 632 P.2d at 696.
42. Id.
43. Id. at . .632 P.2d at 698, 702.
44. Id. at -, 632 P.2d at 700.
45. Id. at -, 632 P.2d at 702.
46. Id.
47. Interview with Professor William Crowley, University of Montana School of Law,
in Missoula, Mont. (Nov. 15, 1990). Interview with Judge Gordon Bennett, in Missoula,
Mont. (Apr. 17, 1991).
48. State ex rel. Guarantee Ins. Co. v. District Court, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 648
(1981).
49. Id. at __, 634 P.2d at 649-50.
50. Id.
[Vol. 52
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supreme court denied the application. 51
The court found the circumstances failed to justify supervisory
control under the traditional standard but, for the first time, ar-
ticulated important policy considerations for future applications.
The court acknowledged that it had issued the writ for discovery
orders in two previous cases,52 but warned:
If this Court were to continue a policy of interjecting itself into
an interlocutory review of rulings of the District Courts of this
state concerning interrogatories and objections thereto, we would
not only make it difficult for the District Court to control day to
day trial administration but we would open a Pandora's Box of
abuses.53
The court noted that the district court has inherent discretionary
power to control discovery and is in a better position to supervise
daily discovery matters.54 True to its word, the supreme court re-
frained from supervisory involvement with discovery matters for
the next eight years.
3. State ex rel. Burlington Northern Railroad v. District Court
The eight-year hiatus following the court's warning against
discovery-related supervisory control in Guarantee Insurance en-
ded when the court exercised supervisory control in State ex rel.
Burlington Northern Railroad v. District Court.5 5 In Burlington
Northern, a railroad car ran over and seriously injured a railroad
employee.5 6 Plaintiff served defendant with interrogatories, re-
quests for production, notice of deposition and deposition sub-
51. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 650. The court grounded its decision on four bases: (1) The
application for the writ was untimely because it was made 40 days after the answers to
interrogatories were due; (2) the relator had not exhausted its available-remedies because it
had not applied for a protective order; (3) the relator had an adequate remedy at law be-
cause the district court can assess the costs of answering the interrogatory against the losing
party; and (4) policy considerations. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 650-51.
52. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 651.
53. Id. Note that the increased applications for supervisory control in discovery mat-
ters seem to correspond to the court's willingness to use Rule 37 sanctions to facilitate dis-
covery. In 1981, Montana followed the federal courts in their treatment of discovery abuses;
that is, abuses will no longer be tolerated and the trial courts' use of Rule 37 sanctions to
enforce discovery orders is encouraged. See Owen v. F.A. Buttrey Co., 192 Mont. 274, 627
P.2d 1233 (1981) (following National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639 (1976)). Only one year later, the court warned of the "paper blizzard" of applica-
tions for the writ. Guarantee Ins., - Mont. at -, 634 P.2d at 651 (1981). Interview with
Professor William Crowley, University of Montana School of Law, in Missoula, Mont. (Nov.
15, 1990).
54. Guarantee Ins., - Mont. at -, 634 P.2d at 650.
55. 239 Mont. 207, 779 P.2d 885 (1989).
56. Id. at 209, 779 P.2d at 887.
19911
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poena duces tecum.57 Included was a request for defendant's entire
investigative file, investigative reports, photographs of the scene,
and witness statements taken by the claims representative. 8 Fol-
lowing disagreement over production of the investigative file, wit-
ness statements, and disclosure of the identity of all expert wit-
nesses consulted by defendant, plaintiff filed a motion to compel.5 9
Defendant in turn filed a motion for an order to protect the wit-
ness statements and the identities of the nontestifying experts.60
The district court denied defendant's motion and ordered the
defendant to identify its nontestifying experts and to produce wit-
ness statements taken by the claims representative.6 1 The court
also restrained defendant from pursuing further discovery until de-
fendant complied with the order and awarded costs and attorney's
fees to plaintiff.2 Defendant applied for a writ of supervisory
control.
In a four-to-three decision, the supreme court granted the de-
fendant's writ of supervisory control.63 The majority cited the
traditional Whiteside test, but also held that supervisory control in
discovery matters is appropriate "'when [a lower court's] order
[would] place a party at a significant disadvantage in litigating the
merits of the case.' "64 Burlington Northern would have been dis-
advantaged by the disclosure of the identity of nontestifying ex-
pert witnesses and by the inability to pursue discovery. In this case
of first impression, the court held "that the identity of non-testify-
ing experts is discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) . . . only upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances. 6e5 The majority also con-
cluded that the sanction imposed (denying defendant further dis-
covery until it complied with the discovery order) was significant
and exceeded the scope of Rule 37, Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure.6
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 210, 779 P.2d at 888.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 211, 779 P.2d at 888.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 212, 779 P.2d at 889 (Weber, Turnage and Harrison, JJ., concurring; Gul-
brandson, J., specially concurring and dissenting; McDonough, Hunt and Sheehy, JJ.,
dissenting).
64. Id. (quoting National Farmer's Union Property & Casualty Co. v. District Court,
718 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Colo. 1986) (The Colorado court held that requiring the defendant
insurance company to produce privileged investigative files would place that party at a sig-
nificant disadvantage in litigating the merits of the case because insurer's counsel would
become a potential witness, which would mandate his withdrawal from the case.)).
65. Id. at 215, 779 P.2d at 890.
66. Burlington Northern, 239 Mont. at 219, 779 P.2d at 893. Rule 37(b)(2), Montana
[Vol. 52
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With the adoption of the "significant disadvantage" language,
the court broadened the potential availability of the writ. Although
the traditional test is still valid, when the writ involves an interloc-
utory order, the "gross injustice" prong of the traditional test is
apparently satisfied if the order places a party at a significant dis-
advantage in litigating the case.
4. State ex rel. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v.
District Court 7
The modification of the traditional test set forth by the Bur-
lington Northern court was followed and confirmed in USF & G,68
a bad faith action based on the Unfair Trade Practices Act.69 The
plaintiff requested production of the entire claims file, including
"'all written communications or memoranda of communications
between the Defendant and its attorney.' -7 "Defendants moved
for a protective order asserting the attorney-client privilege and
work product rule as to [certain] letters."' 71 These letters were be-
tween the defendant and its attorney and "were written . . . after
the damage action was filed. ' 72 The district court denied the pro-
tective order motion and the defendant petitioned for a writ of su-
pervisory control.7 s
Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for sanctions against a party failing to comply with dis-
covery order:
If a party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey
an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just ....
MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
Note that the court also affirmed the order to produce witness statements taken by the
claims representative and affirmed the award of costs and attorney's fees to compensate
plaintiff for the expense of bringing a motion to compel production of discoverable photo-
graphs and witness statements.
The Dissent: Justice Gulbrandson concurred with the majority's holding on all issues
except the affirmation of the award of attorney's fees. Justices McDonough and Hunt dis-
sented to the grant of supervisory control, arguing that discovery orders are interlocutory,
nonappealable, and did not dispose of any major aspect of the case. Supervision in this case
was, therefore, "not necessary or proper." Justice Sheehy, with Justice Hunt concurring,
dissented on the issues of nontestifying experts and severity of the sanctions. Although he
did not directly address the appropriateness of supervisory control, Justice Sheehy stated
that the majority opinion frustrates the district court's ability to make the rules of discovery
work properly.
67. USF & G, 240 Mont. 5, 783 P.2d 911 (1989).
68. Id.
69. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201(2), (3), (6) (1989).
70. USF & G, 240 Mont. at 8, 783 P.2d at 912.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The court's unanimous opinion set forth the traditional test
for issuance of the writ"' and reiterated "that interlocutory review
of discovery orders is not favored," but cited Burlington Northern,
Kuiper and Jaap as examples of appropriate review.7 5 The court
also noted that the discovery of attorney-client communications in
the context of bad faith litigation was an issue of first impression
in Montana, and held that disclosure of the letters would place the
party at a significant disadvantage and the remedy of appeal was,
therefore, inadequate.76 The court concluded that issuance of the
writ was necessary.7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Proper Use of the Writ in Montana
1. Be Aware of the Writ and Follow the Rules
The informed practitioner should realize that supervisory con-
trol exists for errant discovery orders that are neither founded in
the Rules of Civil Procedure nor previously addressed by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. The supreme court likely will grant supervi-
sory control in these circumstances when the errant order would
place the client at a significant disadvantage and when the remedy
by appeal is inadequate.
The attorney should strictly adhere to the application rules.
The application must be timely, and the opportunity for appeal
must be wholly inadequate. An appeal most likely is inadequate
when a discovery order is harmful and improper.
2. Use Prior Cases as Factual Models
The attorney may have a problem interpreting the "significant
disadvantage" requirement. In fact, many litigants opposed to dis-
covery orders may speculate that the orders significantly disadvan-
tage their case. In order to define "significant disadvantage," it is
helpful to look at the specific factual situations at issue in the su-
pervisory control cases. Significant disadvantage likely exists when
a district court fashions a discovery order not provided by the
74. Id. at 8, 783 P.2d at 913 (citing Continental Oil Co. v. Elks Nat'l Found., 235
Mont. 438, 767 P.2d 1324 (1989), and MONT. R. App. P. 17(a) as setting forth the standard
for issuance of the writ).
75. Id. at 8-9, 783 P.2d at 913.
76. Id. at 9, 783 P.2d at 913.
77. Id. The court also held that the attorney-client privilege cannot be overcome by a
showing of need (as distinguished from work product) even in the case of third-party bad
faith. "[T]he attorney-client privilege must remain inviolate." Id. at 14-15, 783 P.2d at 917.
474 [Vol. 52
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/13
SUPERVISORY CONTROL
Rules of Civil Procedure, as in Jaap, or when a court issues a pro-
tective order contrary to public policy, as in Kuiper, or orders the
discovery of privileged information, as in Burlington Northern and
USF & G. Moreover, the practitioner is subject to the good faith
requirement of Rule 11,78 which may help restrict applications to
those cases that are truly threatening to the litigant.
3. The Court Should Articulate a Definitive Standard
The supreme court would assist the bench and bar by articu-
lating a definite standard for issuance of the writ. The standard
should limit the exercise of supervisory control in discovery mat-
ters to those cases of first impression, which are of general impor-
tance to the bench and the bar, and are such that the court's hold-
ing will provide guidance for future cases." The basis for such a
standard already exists. For example, Kuiper, Burlington North-
ern and USF & G all involved discovery issues of first impression.
Further, Jaap overturned a discovery method that did not conform
to the Rules of Civil Procedure and was upheld only once before.80
Absent a clear standard, attorneys are likely to apply for the writ
more often, thereby burdening the supreme court and slowing the
trial process.
Supervisory control was originally intended to correct errors of
law by the trial court, which posed irreparable harm, and that were
not covered by the other jurisdictional-based writs. The court
should amend the error of law requirement to include issues of
first impression.
4. Earmarking Potential Sources for Supervisory Control
The opportunities for supervisory control based on trial court
error probably will be few, but the opportunities arising from cases
of first impression should be many in Montana. Possible areas in-
clude: Limitations on interrogatories, medical examinations in
cases in which the party has not placed its medical condition at
issue, stopping a deposition for bad faith or oppressive conduct,81
78. MONT. R. Civ. P. 11.
79. This guideline was adopted by California in Carter v. Superior Court, 218 Cal.
App. 3d 994, 267 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1990).
80. The discovery method; a private interview between counsel and the opposing
party's doctor, was approved in Callahan v. Burton, 157 Mont 513, 487 P.2d 515 (1971), and
overturned by Jaap v. District Court, 191 Mont. 319, 623 P.2d 1389 (1981).
81. MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(d) provides for this remedy, the question of what constitutes
bad faith or oppressive conduct has yet to be addressed by the court.
1991]
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the allowable scope of discovery prior to filing of a suit,8 2 and the
variety and severity of Rule 37 sanctions.
B. Other Jurisdictions
The writ of supervisory control is unique to Montana, but
many other states allow interlocutory review under the writ of
mandamus. Often, other states treat appellate review of discovery
orders similar to Montana's use of supervisory control, but some
states are considerably more restrictive. For example, West Vir-
ginia has limited interlocutory review of discovery orders specifi-
cally to questions of first impression,83 and California has limited
interlocutory review to questions "of first impression of general im-
portance to the bar and bench, and the answer . . . will provide
guidance for future cases. "84 Other state courts do not permit in-
terlocutory review at all because of the "final judgment" rule.$5
States that do permit interlocutory appeals for discovery or-
ders have varying criteria for granting an appeal, usually similar to
Montana's "irreparable harm" standard and promoting the same
goal of preventing needless litigation. For example, Vermont's
standard of review for overturning a discovery order requires that
"the order must involve a controlling question of law, there must
be substantial grounds for difference of opinion as to that question,
and an immediate appeal must have at least the potential to mate-
rially advance the termination of the litigation."86
82. MONT. R. Civ. P. 34 provides for pre-filing discovery, but the scope has not been
addressed by the court.
83. See, e.g. State ex rel. Bennett v. Keadle, 334 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1985). The West
Virginia court stated that supervisory control is limited to purely legal issues of first impres-
sion, "which means that the Court will not exercise original jurisdiction in future cases to
review the matters addressed in this opinion." Id. at 646.
84. Carter v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 994, 996, 267 Cal. Rptr. 290, 291 (1990).
85. The final judgment rule allows appeals only after final judgment in the case. See,
e.g., Hanley v. Evans, 443 A.2d 65, 66 (Me. 1982); Leathers, Civil Procedure, 72 Ky. L.J. 315,
316 (1983-84).
86. Castle v. Sherburne Corp., 141 Vt. 157, 162, 446 A.2d 350, 352 (1982). Other exam-
ples of standards of review for interlocutory appeal of discovery orders include:
"[E]xceptional circumstances and where necessary to protect substantive rights in the ab-
sence of an alternative, effective remedy," Soja v. T.P. Sampson Co., 373 Mass. 630, 631, 369
N.E.2d 975, 975 (1977); "[not] unless such interlocutory matter involves a usurpation of
judicial power," State ex rel. Gross v. Marshall, 39 Ohio St. 2d 92, 94, 314 N.E.2d 170, 172
(1974) (quoting State ex rel. Staton v. Common Pleas Court, 5 Ohio St. 2d 17, 213 N.E.2d
164 (1965)); "where a party will be beyond relief if review is not granted at that stage of the
proceedings," Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
"[unless] [t]here has been the determination of a substantial issue and the establishment of
a legal right," Levinson v. Conlon, 385 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1978) (quoting Gardinier, Inc. v.
Cities Serv. Co., 349 A.2d 744 (Del. 1975)). 12
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C. The Federal Courts
The United States Supreme Court also has granted interlocu-
tory review of discovery orders (via the writ of mandamus) on oc-
casion, but without a clear governing standard. In a 1976 California
case, a federal district court granted an order compelling produc-
tion of confidential personnel files without in-camera inspection.8 7
The Supreme Court held that, although "the remedy of mandamus
is a drastic one" and Congress intended appellate review for final
judgments only, issuance of the writ is largely a matter of the ap-
pellate court's discretion and is appropriate when the moving party
has no other adequate means of relief.88 In two earlier decisions,
however, the Supreme Court fluctuated between a broad standard
of review to settle new and important problems of law89 and the
traditional standard of mandamus, which requires a question of ju-
risdiction.90 One scholar commented that this controversy essen-
tially gives the federal appellate courts a free hand to utilize man-
damus for interlocutory review as long as the use is within
reasonable limits.9 1
V. CONCLUSION
The writ of supervisory control remains an extraordinary rem-
edy in Montana and is reserved for exceptional circumstances. The
Montana Supreme Court has issued the writ to review lower court
orders in virtually every phase of the trial process. Recently, the
court has shown a willingness to issue supervisory control to review
discovery orders, an area traditionally left to the discretion of the
district court. Although concerned that appellate supervision of
pretrial discovery will flood the judicial system with appeal re-
quests and result in a piecemeal litigation process, the court has
chosen to grant the writ under limited circumstances.
As one commentator observed regarding federal interlocutory
appeals, "the problem facing [the court] is to formulate a sensibly
flexible policy that permits interlocutory review when it is in the
interest of justice, but avoids the costs and potential abuse of
87. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
88. Id. at 402-03.
89. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-12 (1964). The Court also required a
potential "usurpation of power" by the trial judge. Id. at 111. Note that this case also in-
volved an issue of first impression. See Fullerton, Exploring the Far Reaches of Mandamus,
49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1983).
90. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). See Note, Mandamus as a Means of
Federal Interlocutory Review, 38 Omo ST. L.J. 301, 314-15 (1977).
91. Note, supra note 90, at 315.
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piecemeal litigation.""2 The Montana Supreme Court has exercised
the writ when the district court has issued an errant discovery or-
der, thus placing a party at a significant disadvantage in litigating
the merits of the case, and when the remedy by appeal is
inadequate.
The "significant disadvantage" requirement is vague, but the
factual circumstances of the cases discussed'herein provide some
guidance. Questions involving the discovery of privileged informa-
tion seem likely to risk placing a party at a significant disadvan-
tage in litigating a case. Furthermore, in three of the four recent
cases in which the court granted supervisory control to review a
discovery order, the discovery order involved a question of first im-
pression; however, the court has not stated that a case of first im-
pression is included in the "error of law" requirement for issuance
of the writ, or required for issuance. The court should clarify the
standard. Perhaps the court could limit review of discovery orders
to questions of first impression that are of importance to the bench
and bar.
To the Montana practitioner, the recent decisions signify that
relief may be available for harmful discovery orders. If attorneys
restrict their applications to only those cases that truly are unfair
to the client or the case, and for which other relief is inadequate,
the supreme court can prevent needless litigation while avoiding
the dreaded paper blizzard of appeals.
92. Id. at 304.
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